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ABSTRACT 
THE STARRY HEAVENS ABOVE ME 
AND THE STARMAKING POWER WITHIN ME 
by 
Philip T. L. Mack 
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Under the Supervision of Professor Robert Schwartz 
 
 
 
The worldmaking thesis stands as a contentious view of reality. Its primary tenet, that we 
play a role in cognitively making objects, properties, facts, and thereby the world, is 
dismissed by many philosophers as an incoherent and misguided position. In this paper I 
critically discuss the thesis and defend it against several criticisms: that (1) it is 
cosmologically incoherent, (2) raises a problem of causation, (3) implies subjectivism, (4) 
commits a use-mention fallacy, and (5) it commits the problem of disagreement. I show 
that these criticisms are not ultimately deleterious to the thesis. Furthermore, I explore 
ways in which worldmaking constitutes a more satisfactory account of objects, 
properties, and facts over and against competing views, viz., metaphysical realism.  
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1 
Introduction 
That we play a role in cognitively making the world is an exceedingly difficult 
view to defend.  On the face of it, the intuition that objects, properties, and facts depend 
on and emerge through our categorizations and conceptualizations might strike one as 
manifestly absurd.  Surely the world is as it is independent of us.  It is composed of 
objects, properties, and facts over which we have no control and which exist with or 
without us – the most we can plausibly do is name and describe those objects and 
discover their properties and facts.  Unsurprisingly, the thesis that we make the world is a 
controversial one and is batted away whenever it is raised.  I will focus on an approach to 
worldmaking which finds expression in two of its chief proponents, William James, at the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century, and later by Nelson Goodman, though my focus will be 
almost entirely on Goodman, since contemporary criticism is aimed at his position.
1
 
Briefly, James and Goodman advance a strong ontological claim – that what it is 
to be an object, property, or fact at all is to be carved out from the flux of experience.  
That is to say, there is no sense to be made, prior to our delineations, of pre-existing 
objects, properties, or facts.  This claim has proved distasteful to many philosophers, 
because it seems utterly implausible to say that because we conceptualize and categorize 
the world in some way (with a scientific theory, for example) the world actually is the 
way we describe it to be.  In Parts I and II of this paper I shall discuss this ontological 
claim and defend it against the following criticisms: (1) it is cosmologically incoherent; 
(2) it raises a problem of causation; (3) it implies subjectivism; (4) it commits a use-
mention fallacy; and (5) it commits the problem of disagreement.  In so doing, I will 
                                                        
1
 See also Richard Rorty, Truth and Progress, Philosophical Papers, Volume 3 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998). 
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elaborate the worldmaking thesis and show, when so understood, these criticisms are not 
ultimately detrimental to it.  In Part III I will argue that because worldmaking survives 
these criticisms, it should be considered as a plausible alternative to other metaphysical 
positions, viz., metaphysical realism. 
Part I 
 
An Explication of the Worldmaking Thesis 
 
It is perhaps best to understand worldmaking against a metaphysical realist 
conception of the world.  In brief, a proponent of metaphysical realism advances the 
notion that the world’s content, that is, its properties, facts, and objects, exists readymade, 
external to, and independent of human cognition, conceptualization, and categorization.
2
  
Furthermore, a proponent of realism usually holds that objects, properties, and facts lie 
waiting for us to discover.  Using our powers of inquiry and discovery, we extract the 
content from what is given in reality, rather than considering that what is given can only 
make sense if we give it content.  According to this view, then, any constructivist picture 
of reality is fundamentally backwards – we play no role in constructing objects, 
properties, or facts.  Instead, all we can do is uncover reality by discovering the content 
already embedded in it; we discover the content in reality, we play no role in constructing 
it. 
Contra realism, the worldmaking thesis holds that we play a role in making the 
world through our conceptualizations and categorizations.  To this effect, Goodman 
                                                        
2
 Cf. Panayot Butchvarov, "Metaphysical Realism," in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed., 
ed. Robert Audi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 562-63. See also Hilary Putnam, Reason, 
Truth, and History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 49-54. 
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states, “we make worlds by making versions.”3  The terms “construct” or “make,” 
however, must be clarified.  That we play a role in constructing the content of the world 
does not imply that we physically construct objects out of the requisite bits of matter.
4
  
The terms “make” or “construct” simply mean we help shape objects by shaping 
properties, thereby conferring ontological content to the world through our cognitive 
work. 
Both Goodman and James contend that the human contribution to the world’s 
composition is impossible to ignore.  An underlying principle of this position is the 
notion that we cannot separate what is given in reality from how we take it to be.
5
  
Goodman states, “[t]alk of unstructured content or an unconceptualized given or a 
substratum without properties is self-defeating; for the talk imposes structure, 
conceptualizes, ascribes properties.”6  The true or correct way in which we categorize and 
conceptualize reality is the way in which reality takes on content; there are no intrinsic 
properties, facts, or objects in the world.  Goodman further states, “[a]s nothing is at rest 
or is in motion apart from a frame of reference, so nothing is primitive or is derivationally 
prior to anything apart from a constructional system”7  and “[modes of organization] are 
not ‘found in the world’ but built into a world.”8   
The argument for worldmaking can, thus, be characterized as follows.  What it is 
to be an object, property, or fact at all is to be delineated from the sensible flux of 
experience.  It follows that, prior to our delineation, reality has no content – that is, there 
                                                        
3
 Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1978), 94. See also 
Nelson Goodman, “On Starmaking,” in Starmaking: Realism, Anti-Realism, and Irrealism, ed. Peter J. 
McCormick (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996), 144-45. 
4
 Goodman, “On Starmaking,” 145. 
5
 Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, 7. 
6
 Ibid., 6. 
7
 Ibid., 12. 
8
 Ibid., 14. Emphasis is Goodman’s. 
   
4 
are no pre-existing or pre-conceptualized objects, properties, or facts in the world.  
Metaphysical realism, as adumbrated above, is committed to pre-existing and pre-
discriminated objects, properties, and facts.  Thus, realism is false and the best 
explanation of reality is that we play a role in constructing it. 
Worldmakers argue that there is something with which making begins – call it a 
sensible flux, particles, matter, or an unstructured given.  Although there is stuff with 
which we begin, there is no specific kind of stuff – no objects, properties, or facts inhere 
in it.  Whichever way we conceptualize and categorize this stuff is the way in which 
objects, properties, and facts emerge.
9
  To elucidate this notion, it is helpful to invoke the 
Quinean expression, “[t]here is no entity without identity.”10  Goodman, on this score, 
writes, “[i]dentification rests upon organization into entities and kinds.”11  There is no 
way to differentiate between things without cognitive making – ontology depends on 
individuation.  To this effect, James states, “[w]e break the flux of sensible reality into 
things…We create the subjects of our true as well as of our false propositions.  We create 
the predicates also.”12  The world’s objects (the subjects), therefore, emerge through our 
constructive work by becoming individuated and differentiated.  Objects become 
delineated once we predicate something of them – say, some property or fact that we also 
played a role in creating.  Thus, objects and their facts depend on our concepts and 
theories.  If we do not play a role in shaping their properties and facts, objects are not 
only devoid of content, but cannot properly be called objects because there is no way to 
                                                        
9
 Ibid., 6. For a related discussion, see Iris Einheuser, “Toward a Conceptualist Solution of the Grounding 
Problem,” Noûs 45, no. 2 (2011): 300-314. Although Einheuser’s discussion and recommendations 
regarding the notion of “starting with something” are interesting, I will follow the Goodmanian picture, 
according to which we start our worldmaking process with an unstructured given. 
10
 W. V. Quine, Theories and Things (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 102. 
11
 Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, 7-8. 
12
 William James, Pragmatism, ed. Bruce Kuklick (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981), 114. 
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differentiate them from the rest of the flux of experience.  Until the world is made in such 
a way, it has no objects, properties, or facts. 
Goodman provides a helpful illustration of the above notion, which is worth 
quoting in full: 
I sit in a cluttered waiting room, unaware of any stereo system.  Gradually 
I make out two speakers built into the bookcase, a receiver and turntable in 
a corner cabinet, and a remote control switch on the mantel.  I find a 
system that was already there.  But see what this finding involves: 
distinguishing the several components from the surroundings, categorizing 
them by function, and uniting them into a single whole.  A good deal of 
making, with complex conceptual equipment, has gone into finding what 
is already there.  Another visitor, fresh from a lifetime in the deepest 
jungle, will not find, because he has not the means of making, any stereo 
system in that room.  Nor will he find books there; but in the books and 
plants I find he may find fuel and food that I do not.  Not only does he not 
know that the stereo set is one; he does not recognize as a thing at all that 
which I know to be a stereo system – that is, he does not make out or make 
any such object.
13
 
 
Goodman’s illustration nicely exemplifies the foregoing, especially the claim that object-
hood depends on our conceptual work.  Until our subject has delineated the space he is 
presented with, there is, strictly speaking, no stereo system or any of its component parts, 
just an undifferentiated sensible flux. 
This illustration also makes clear the worldmaker’s claim that we construct the 
world with something that is already present, something we take for granted – although, 
this “something” is not some specific kind of thing.  Just what is this stuff we are taking 
for granted? The answer is that it is context sensitive – that is, it is relative to our projects, 
interests, norms, etcetera.  For example, just as someone needs reed to weave a basket, 
the constellation-maker needs stars and the star-maker needs the right kind of physical 
matter.  In each case something is being constructed, not from nothing, but instead, from 
                                                        
13
 Nelson Goodman, “Notes on the Well-Made World,” in Starmaking: Realism, Anti-Realism, and 
Irrealism, ed. Peter J. McCormick (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996), 155-56. 
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whatever material is appropriate for the project.  The basic idea here is that there is not 
some one thing that everything is made of, but rather that everything is made of 
something. 
James puts the point aptly: “[w]e receive in short the block of marble, but we 
carve the statue ourselves.”14  Just as a sculptor gives form to a block of marble after 
carving and polishing it such that it results in a sculpture, we do the same to the world.  
More precisely, much like the sculptor begins with a slab of marble and proceeds to 
carve, chip away, and construct the sculpture he has in mind in order to give it a specific 
form, we also begin with a slab of marble – the sensible flux of experience – and proceed 
to construct objects, properties, and facts via our categorizations, conceptualizations and 
theories – our chisels.  Without the sculptor’s artistic rendering, the block of marble 
remains just that, a block of marble.  It would be absurd to say that the resultant sculpture 
was somehow pre-existent in the slab of marble, and the sculptor simply chiseled his way 
around it so as to make manifest this pre-existent form.  Analogously, without our 
constructive work, the sensible flux remains a characterless sensible flux.  There exist no 
pre-conceptualized objects, properties, or facts waiting to be discovered, but rather, we, 
along with the marble or sensible flux itself, help make the sculpture or world what it is. 
One may object at this juncture, however, and point out that the sculpted piece of 
marble was actually in the block before the sculptor set out to work, and in this sense the 
composition – the object and its properties and facts – was already in the block, thus 
refuting the claim that independent of our constructive work, the world is devoid of 
content.  It would seem as though we do, after all, discover the facts and properties of the 
world, which were already present.  In an uninteresting sense this is certainly correct, the 
                                                        
14
 James, Pragmatism, 112. 
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piece of marble that became the sculpture was contained in the marble block.  However, 
even if it was always there, the sculptor brought it out of the block of marble; he did the 
constructive work, and gave the marble its shape, just as in the case of the stereo system 
in the waiting room Goodman describes.  The question, then, is as follows:  is there any 
significant way in which the world is any different from the sculptor and the block of 
marble? The answer, according to the worldmaker is simply, no. 
Consider also an illustration both James and Goodman offer regarding 
constellations.
15
  “We carve out groups of stars in the heavens,” James writes, “and call 
them constellations, and the stars patiently suffer us to do so.”16  We locate a group of 
seven stars in the sky and append to them some name, say, the Big Dipper.  Although this 
collection of stars existed as undifferentiated extraterrestrial stuff prior to our 
constructive work, they did not exist as the Big Dipper (i.e., as a differentiated object we 
call by the name ‘Big Dipper’) prior to our conceptual creation.17  It is in this sense that 
we construct an object (i.e., the Big Dipper constellation) from the sensible flux of 
experience.  Moreover, any star from this collection now has the property of being a star 
that constitutes part of the Big Dipper, while the Big Dipper, too, now has the property of 
being composed of seven stars.  The property of being included in the Big Dipper, and 
the Big Dipper itself, was not inherent in the world, but rather, we made it the case by 
creating the constellation with the particular stars we chose.  This is the way in which we 
make the properties of objects (that the Big Dipper has seven stars and the stars that 
compose the Big Dipper have the property of populating it).  Finally, because we play a 
                                                        
15
 Goodman, “Notes on the Well-Made World,” 156. 
16
 James, Pragmatism, 113. See also William James, The Meaning of Truth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1975), 56. 
17
 Goodman, “Notes on the Well-Made World,” 156. 
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role in making this property of these stars, we thereby make it a fact that this star has that 
property.  And this is the sense in which we make facts (it is a fact that those seven stars 
constitute the Big Dipper and that each one has the property of being part of the Big 
Dipper).  What is true or false about statements concerning those stars – whether this or 
that star is or is not a Big Dipper star – is independent of us after we have done our 
constructive work. 
But worldmakers don’t stop at constellations.  The stars themselves, they argue, 
are as much made as the constellations they populate.
18
  Just as we delineate and 
discriminate collections of stars in the sky to shape the constellations, we also delineate 
and differentiate what it is to be a star from the rest of the sensible flux of experience.  
What constitutes star-hood does not come readymade or pre-conceptualized; there are no 
inherent properties that indicate to us that such-and-such is a star.  Instead, we determine 
what constitutes star-hood (with our scientific theories, for example).  Goodman 
contends, “we make stars by drawing certain boundaries rather than others.  Nothing 
dictates whether the skies shall be marked off into constellations or other objects.”19  
Although stars (or star stuff) existed prior to and independent of our concepts and 
theories as undifferentiated and unindividuated masses of physical particles in the sky, 
they did not exist as objects, or stars for that matter – they had no inherent properties that 
enabled us to distinguish them as distinct star-objects from other cosmic matter.
20
  Thus, 
if it were not for our cognitive making, stars would not have the properties that make 
them stars, and so they would not be stars, ontologically speaking.  Their object-hood, 
properties, and the facts about them depend wholly upon our conceptual making. 
                                                        
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid. 
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Moreover, our concepts pertaining to stars and constellations can account for their 
existing before we existed and carried out our constructive work.
21
  When we formulate a 
concept regarding stars or constellations we include within that concept that they predate 
us.  These facts and properties about stars and constellations we help construct, therefore, 
obtain ex post facto.  Additionally, that a certain star populating the Big Dipper has more 
volume, shines brighter, and is farther away from Earth than the rest is true quite 
independent of us.  Just as worldmakers can accommodate the stars predating us, they can 
consistently claim that a particular star has more volume, shines brighter, and is farther 
away from Earth than the rest.  These claims are not at variance with the worldmaking 
thesis. 
In conjunction with the above, worldmaking includes a pluralistic component.  
Because Goodman rejects the notion of the world as given, or as he sometimes puts it, 
“the way the world is,”22 without it being one way or another, he rejects also the notion 
that there is an independent standard by which we can test the veridicality of our 
constructions or versions.  To this effect, Goodman writes, versions “can be treated as our 
worlds.”23  Goodman partially explains what he means by there being many worlds as 
follows:  “many different world-versions are of independent interest and importance, 
without any requirement or presumption of reducibility to a single base.”24  Goodman’s 
notion that world-versions are not reducible to a “single base” is motivated by his 
conviction that arguments in support of such a position are “vague,” have “negligible” 
                                                        
21
 Ibid. See also Nelson Goodman, “On Some Worldly Worries,” in Starmaking: Realism, Anti-Realism, 
and Irrealism, ed. Peter J. McCormick (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996), 166-67. 
22
 Nelson Goodman, “The Way the World Is,” in Starmaking: Realism, Anti-Realism, and Irrealism, ed. 
Peter J. McCormick (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996), 9. 
23
 Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, 4. 
24
 Ibid. 
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evidence, and that the popular candidate by which reducibility might be possible, physics, 
is “itself fragmentary and unstable.”25 
An important motivating factor of Goodman’s pluralism stems from situations in 
which one or more theories are contradictory, albeit adequate.  The rough question raised 
by such situations, and addressed by Goodman, is how can we account for situations in 
which two theories are true, but nevertheless, conflict?  He offers several examples to 
illustrate his answer, one of which involves making assertions about points and lines 
when our universe of discourse is “limited to a square segment of a plane, with two pairs 
of boundary lines labeled ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal.”’26  Assuming there exist points, 
Goodman asks us to consider two sentences, which conflict, but are nevertheless true 
when asserted under the appropriate conditions: 
(14) Every point is made up of a vertical and a horizontal line 
(15) No point is made up of lines or anything else.
27
 
 
After considering two distinct types of spaces under which we can evaluate the truth-
values of these sentences – one in which lines exist exclusively, and one in which points 
exist exclusively, making (14) true and (15) false, and (15) true and (14) false, 
respectively – Goodman considers a type of space consisting of both lines and points.  In 
this space, of course, neither (14) nor (15) is false, but it is not the case that both of them 
can be true at the same time.
28
  Thus, Goodman concludes, if both sentences are true, then 
they must be true in distinct “realms,” because they cannot both be true in one realm.29  
Ultimately, Goodman concludes versions are like the two sentences above in that “their 
                                                        
25
 Ibid., 4-5. 
26
 Ibid., 114. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid., 115. 
29
 Ibid. 
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realms are thus less aptly regarded as within one world than as two different worlds, and 
even…as worlds in conflict.”30 
Goodman’s pluralism, then, contains the idea that we can have contradictory 
theories or versions, both of which are satisfactory so long as the theories are not 
embedded in or constructing one and the same world.  If they were both constructing the 
same world, then, of course, the Law of Non-Contradiction would be violated, and one or 
both of the theories would have to be jettisoned. Thus, we use different universes of 
discourse, which are tantamount to different worlds, so that the contradictory versions are 
not conjoined within the same world or universe of discourse. Therefore, the Law of 
Non-Contradiction is not violated, and we can maintain two incompatible theories at the 
same time, they are merely in reference to two distinct worlds. 
Consider the following broader elucidation than the ones Goodman offers.  If 
Protagoras occupies the perspective of Version-Δ, and according to Version-Δ, P is true, 
then he can consistently assert that P in this world, call it “World-Δ.”  On the other hand, 
if Protagoras occupies the perspective of Version-Σ, and according to Version-Σ, not-P is 
true, then he can consistently assert that not-P in this world, call it “World-Σ.”  If 
Version-Δ and Version-Σ – and accordingly, World-Δ and World- Σ – overlap, then 
Protagoras cannot consistently claim that P, because this would violate the Law of Non-
Contradiction.  However, this is not an issue for the worldmaking thesis.  Pluralism can 
thrive under this position, because, as the Goodmanian slogan goes, “we make worlds by 
making versions.”31  He goes on to write, “[t]he multiple worlds I countenance are just 
                                                        
30
 Ibid., 116. 
31
 Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, 94. 
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the actual worlds made by and answering to true or right versions.”32  Each version is a 
different, distinct world, and so, as long as Protagoras occupies one world or the other he 
will not contradict himself when asserting either that P or that not-P, respectively. 
What fundamentally characterizes worldmaking, then, is the claim that we 
construct objects, properties, and facts with the use of our cognitive powers, and 
moreover, distinct world-versions make distinct worlds, giving the position a pluralistic 
flavor.  The notion that the world consists of pre-conceptualized objects, properties, and 
facts awaiting our discovery is misguided.  James nicely articulates this by denying “the 
belief that there is an ‘eternal’ edition of [the world] ready-made and complete’” and 
advancing the position that “the world is still in the process of making.”33 The 
implication of such a position is that reality’s composition and character depends on our 
categorization and conceptualization.
34
  The position is characterized, also, by its 
pluralistic component.  Incompatible world-versions do not conflict with one another 
because each version is a separate world.  Thus, satisfactory, yet contradictory world-
versions are not susceptible of violating the Law of Non-Contradiction. 
Part II 
 
Criticisms and Responses 
 
The Cosmological Objection 
From nothing, nothing comes.  This much the worldmaker will concede.  
Worldmaking is committed to starting its construction of the world from somewhere – be 
it the sensible flux of experience or unstructured given – and it is this commitment that 
                                                        
32
 Ibid. 
33
 William James, “The Absolute and the Strenuous Life,” The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and 
Scientific Methods 4, no. 20 (Sep., 1907): 547. 
34
 Ibid. Cf. Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, 132. 
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critics tend to attack.  Paul Boghossian, for instance, argues that since worldmakers must 
be committed to a basic starting point in order to get construction off the ground, 
worldmaking is incoherent.  If there is something upon which construction can do its 
work, then that seems to imply that there is a readymade world, that there are some basic, 
intrinsic facts and properties beyond our reach, independent of our construction.
35
  
Boghossian argues, “it must be assumed that there are some basic facts – the basic 
worldly dough – on which our redescriptive strategies can get to work.  But that is 
precisely what fact-constructivism denies.”36  In like fashion, John Searle argues that the 
worldmaker effectively “presupposes realism, because it presupposes a language-
independent reality that can be carved up or divided up in different ways.”37  Searle 
shares Boghossian’s conclusion, maintaining that the worldmaker must be committed to a 
readymade reality independent of our constructive work – one that contains some basic 
fact or facts – because if no such reality exists, worldmaking cannot begin.  But the 
worldmaker denies this.  Thus, worldmaking is both committed to and not committed to 
there being some basic facts independent of our making. 
Response to the Cosmological Objection 
Although worldmaking is committed to some starting point from which 
construction begins, this commitment does not imply the incoherency Boghossian and 
Searle believe it does.  It is true that worldmaking must start with something, but it is not 
                                                        
35
 Paul Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2006), 35-38. 
36
 Ibid., 37-38. 
37
 John Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 165. It may seem odd 
to present Searle as an enemy of constructivism when he is a constructivist in another sense – that we 
construct social facts. What’s relevant here is that he recognizes constructivism in some cases (the social 
facts case, in particular), but in other cases he doesn’t (Derrida’s deconstructionism and Goodman’s 
worldmaking, for example) – he doesn’t believe the physical world is constructed the way worldmakers do. 
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some particular, determinate thing that we start with.  It does not follow that this basic 
stuff upon which making commences has inherent in it some primitive facts and 
properties that are required for making.  Consider a space filled with particles, atoms, 
matter, a sensible flux, or whatever.  Call this the basic stuff with which worldmaking can 
begin.  There are, then, multiple ways we can start the worldmaking process – that is, we 
have options.  We can organize the stuff we choose – say, we choose some particles, 
bearing in mind that we could have started with atoms or matter or something else – in 
myriad ways depending on and according to our interests, projects, and needs.  This is the 
way in which worldmaking does its work; we categorize and differentiate whichever stuff 
we choose to work with and thereby begin making the world.  As mentioned above, the 
basket weaver needs reed to weave a basket, the constellation-maker needs stars and the 
star-maker needs whatever physical matter is deemed appropriate for making stars. 
The upshot of these considerations is twofold.  First, it shows that Boghossian and 
Searle mischaracterize worldmaking.  While making starts with something, there is no 
one unique starting point, “no ontologically privileged basis”38  like the “basic worldly 
dough.” Depending on our projects and needs, we may start with different bases.  Second, 
the space filled with basic stuff did not come with some pre-established organization.  
There was no given ontology, no basic facts or properties inherent in this space; what was 
given, in other words, was completely ontologically unstructured.  Facts and properties 
only emerged after we categorized the stuff into different groupings depending on our 
practical interests.  The same goes for the world.  It makes no sense to talk about the 
world’s ontology as it is given, because such an enterprise is unachievable.  As 
                                                        
38
 Iris Einheuser, “Fear of Knowledge,” The Philosophical Review 117, no. 3 (2008): 453. See also 
Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, 6. 
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mentioned above, such talk is self-defeating – we cannot talk about the given without 
taking it to be someway.  The “basic worldly dough” to which Boghossian refers is not a 
basic fact – it is not a fact in any sense.  It is, of course, yet another option for our starting 
point for making, but that it is an optional starting point does not imply that it contains or 
is a basic fact.  Again, there is no single unique basis from which making commences.  
Thus, Boghossian and Searle mischaracterize the position, and as a result, miss their 
target.  Moreover, worldmaking is not committed to there being pre-conceptualized facts 
independent of our making, and accordingly, is not rendered incoherent by the 
cosmological objection. 
A Problem of Causation 
As we have seen, worldmakers maintain that objects, properties, and facts depend 
on our conceptual making.  But critics argue that this position is susceptible to an obvious 
counterexample: what of objects, properties, and facts that pre-exist humans? Surely, they 
argue, it cannot be the case that mountains and stars were constructed by our cognitive 
making.
39
  It was and is a fact that mountains and stars existed before humans could 
construct such a fact or those objects themselves.
40
  Boghossian asserts, “it’s a truism 
about most of the objects and facts that we talk about…that their existence antedates 
ours,” and subsequently asks, “[how], then, could their existence depend on us?”41  He 
labels this the “problem of causation,” because, he argues, “[this view] commits us to a 
bizarre form of backwards causation, where the cause (our activity) comes later than its 
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effect (the existence of the dinosaurs).”42  Thus, critics argue, worldmaking offends our 
commonsense intuition that certain objects, their properties, and facts existed before we 
did.  It seems worldmaking would have to commit itself to “a bizarre form of backwards 
causation” in order for its view of objects and facts to be coherent.   
Response to the Problem of Causation 
 The problem of causation, although intuitively attractive, is based upon a 
misunderstanding of worldmaking.  Worldmakers maintain that we can include in our 
concepts facts and objects that existed before us.  Goodman notes, “if stars like 
constellations are made by versions, how can the stars have been there eons before all 
versions?  Plainly, through being made by a version that puts the stars much earlier than 
itself in its own time-space.”43  Once we have made it the case that some particular 
undifferentiated and unindividuated mass of extraterrestrial stuff constitutes star-hood via 
our concepts or theories, it is consistent for the worldmaker to claim that stars pre-existed 
us and would have existed without us as long as this temporal claim is included in the 
concept or theory.  Thus, while it seems troubling to say that we make objects that existed 
before us, all this means is that after we have completed our constructive work, objects 
like stars and the facts and properties they have, as mentioned above, obtain ex post facto.  
Worldmakers can, therefore, consistently claim without any “bizarre form of backwards 
causation” that stars and other like objects existed before us and would have existed 
without us – though not as inherent in a readymade world – and because this is the case, 
worldmaking avoids the problem of causation. 
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Worldmaking Implies Subjectivism 
  Critics also raise the concern that worldmaking leads to subjectivism about truth, 
and implies an “anything goes” mentality.  We can imagine, they argue, that it is within 
the bounds of worldmaking that humans can make of the world what they will – its 
character and qualities are subject to our arbitrary whims and fancies.
44
  If we make 
objects, properties, and facts, then we run the risk of engendering radically relativistic, 
counterintuitive ontologies containing no objective truth or facts of the matter.  But if this 
is the case, critics argue, then truth is completely dependent upon us, and worldmaking 
implies subjectivism. 
Response to the Objection that Worldmaking Implies Subjectivism 
Although it may seem that worldmaking implies subjectivism, the thesis does not 
allow for arbitrarily “making up” properties, facts, or objects at will, nor does it push 
objective truth by the wayside.
45
  There are constraints on the view which erase this 
danger.  For instance, any arbitrarily “made up” accounts of reality would eventually be 
eliminated and replaced by accounts that better accord with our purposes and practices in 
the world – those which enable us to act more proficiently and with better assurance.  
Plus, we must constrain making with the norms of inquiry currently in place – for 
example, our background beliefs and best available scientific theories.  Goodman 
explains that although truth “cannot be defined or tested by agreement with ‘the world,’” 
worldmakers can nevertheless advance a definition of truth.
46
  “A version is taken to be 
true,” Goodman writes, “when it offends no unyielding beliefs and none of its own 
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precepts.”47  What Goodman means by “unyielding beliefs,” among other things, are the 
“laws of logic” and our perennial beliefs, norms, and practices.48  “Precepts” include 
whatever frame of reference we choose to regulate our construction with.
49
  Thus, if a 
world-version is to be posited, it must not only accord with the current norms of inquiry, 
but it must also conform to long-standing beliefs and practices which influence our 
construction of worlds.  The version, accordingly, must not conflict with the resistance 
provided by these current, and historical, norms.  This is enough to prevent 
unconstrained, arbitrary constructions of worlds. 
 A decidedly pragmatic constraint on worldmaking includes the requirement that 
whatever we construct must be useful for navigating the world more effectively.
50
  Our 
constructions can be useful, for example, insofar as they help us predict and explain 
events.  If we are to judge one construction of the world better than another for the 
purpose of eliminating wildly implausible constructions, then we look to the usefulness 
of each construction.
51
  Whichever version is more useful – for example, in helping us to 
predict and explain events from the perspective of the norms of practice, inquiry, and/or 
science at a particular point in time – than another in certain situations and contexts is the 
better, or more successful, of the two versions. 
Another constraint concerns our sensory experience and the background beliefs 
we bring to our inquiries and constructions.  James writes, “[w]oe to him whose beliefs 
play fast and loose with the order which realities follow in his experience; they will lead 
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him nowhere or else make false connexions.”52  The “realities” to which James refers in 
this passage are, among other things, our sensory experience, background beliefs, and 
current norms of inquiry.  We must comply with this experience, else our constructions 
will result in incongruity and inappropriateness.  Thus, James notes, “[w]e plunge 
forward into the field of fresh experience with the beliefs our ancestors and we have 
made already; these determine what we notice; what we notice determines what we do; 
what we do again determines what we experience.”53  Our construction of the world’s 
ontology is, therefore, restricted by the background beliefs we bring along with ourselves 
– we are constrained by and build upon what we already have.  These constraints together 
prevent our constructions from being completely arbitrary. 
Finally, consider again the constellation illustration set forth above.  After we 
have made the Big Dipper by grouping seven stars, the facts about the Big Dipper and the 
stars that compose it are as much independent of us as they are dependent on us.  The 
facts are dependent on us insofar as we make it a fact that these seven stars each have the 
property of being included in the Big Dipper and that they constitute the Big Dipper.  The 
facts are independent of us insofar as after we have made the constellation, propositions 
about the Big Dipper can have a truth-value – for example, it can be true or false that the 
Big Dipper has n stars and whether some stars are or are not stars that populate the Big 
Dipper.  These facts or truths, once constructed, depend on the constellation itself.  There 
is no subjectivity about truth here; it is as objective as it gets.  Thus, worldmaking does 
not imply subjectivism. 
Worldmaking is Committed to a Use-Mention Fallacy 
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Michael Devitt contends that worldmakers commit a use-mention fallacy.
54
  He 
argues that proponents of worldmaking blur “the crucial distinction between theories of 
the world and the world itself.”55  He illustrates this as follows: the creation of the word 
‘rose’ brought with it a “condition of reference: (1) ‘rose’ refers…to something in virtue 
of its being R (where…‘R’ expresses whatever property something must have to be 
referred to by ‘rose’).”56  The crucial move in this argument comes in where “[t]he 
meaning of ‘rose’ does not alone determine, for example, that (2) ‘rose’ refers to b.  To 
establish (2), we need not only (1) but also (3) b is R.  And (3) is something that is right 
outside our control.”57  Thus, for something (b in this case) to be referred to by the 
expression ‘rose’, it (b) must also be R, where R denotes “whatever property something 
must have to be referred to by ‘rose’: “Something has to be a rose to be referred to by 
‘rose’.”58  But, Devitt notes, something being a ‘rose’ is neither shaped nor determined 
by our power of reference or description, it is instead determined by a property already 
existing in reality. 
Devitt argues that we have no power to construct the properties of b such that it 
satisfies the conditions requisite for being referred to by the expression ‘rose’. The most 
that is within our power is being able to use the word ‘rose’ to refer to something that is 
R.  Thus, Devitt concludes, because rose-hood is controlled by reality, and not human 
construction, worldmaking is untenable, because the position is committed to a confusion 
between using words to refer to objects with the notion that we take part in making the 
                                                        
54
 Cf. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, 166. 
55
 Michael Devitt, Realism and Truth, 2
nd
 ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 241. See also Devitt, 
“Worldmaking Made Hard” and Putting Metaphysics First: Essays on Metaphysics and Epistemology 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
56
 Ibid., 242; my emphasis. 
57
 Ibid., 242-43; my emphasis. 
58
 Ibid., 244. 
   
21 
properties of those objects, and the objects themselves, such that the word can refer to 
them.  This relation simply does not hold, Devitt says, and because this is the case, 
worldmaking is deeply misguided. 
Devitt provides a playful supplementary discussion of this argument, which 
clarifies its major claims:   
Consider one of the kinds that we have so far overlooked: the kind of 
object that strains the credulity of tourists from Peoria.  Let us introduce a 
name for this kind of object: ‘peorincred’.  Now, as a matter of fact, 
echidnas are peorincreds.  But our linguistic decision did not make them 
so: they always were peorincreds, and would have been even if people had 
never introduced the word ‘peorincred’ or any other word.  Peorincreds 
are part of the ready-made world.
59
 
 
Devitt furthermore notes that constructivists confuse the freedom of reference with “one 
we do not have: the freedom to choose which kinds objects are members of.  We can 
choose to name stones and not peorincreds, but we cannot choose whether something is a 
stone or a peorincred.”60  He claims that we simply do not have the constructive power to 
create the properties objects have, properties are inherent in objects already.  What we 
can do is discover those properties and, subsequently, have the ability to utter correct 
referential propositions between a word and the property an individual must have in order 
to be referred to by that word.  Worldmaking’s crucial tenet is, according to Devitt, 
simply false. 
Searle further illustrates this criticism when he writes, “[f]rom the fact that our 
knowledge/conception/picture of reality is constructed by human brains in human 
interactions, it does not follow that the reality of which we have the 
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knowledge/conception/picture is constructed by human brains in human interactions.”61  
Searle notes that this is a non sequitur, and indeed it is, as the conclusion simply does not 
follow from the premise.  Israel Scheffler shares Searle’s conviction.  He notes that from 
the premise that reality cannot be understood nor made sense of apart from human 
cognition it does not follow that reality is thereby made by human cognition.
62
  The pith 
of his criticism is that our words and concepts make neither the world nor its objects, 
properties, and facts.  Thus, Searle and Scheffler argue that even if it is the case that 
human cognition plays a role in constructing how we take reality to be, it does not 
necessarily follow that reality is actually constructed by human cognition. 
Searle further argues that worldmakers fail to recognize that reality “does not care 
how we describe it and it remains the same under the various different descriptions we 
give of it.”63  He considers a thought experiment in which we imagine some portion of 
the world described by humans.  He then asks us to imagine that humans become extinct.  
What, then, happens to the objects and facts in this portion of the world? Searle’s answer 
is, “[a]bsolutely nothing.  Different descriptions of facts, objects, etc., came and went, but 
the facts, objects, etc., remained unaffected.”64  Searle’s point is that objects and facts 
exist even if our descriptions of those objects and facts never existed.  A more crucial 
point is Searle’s argument that there is a distinction to be made between facts and objects 
and descriptions of those facts and objects.  The former, Searle says, are completely 
independent of our cognitive work, while the latter are dependent upon us, but do nothing 
to delimit, and thereby construct, the facts and objects of the world. 
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Response to the Charge of a Use-Mention Fallacy 
What is unsatisfactory about this criticism is that its proponents, especially Devitt, 
have a tendency to presuppose realism in their argument against worldmaking.  This 
results in begging the question against the worldmaker.  For the criticism to be 
successful, it needs to work from within the position, or at the very least appreciate it to 
some degree.  The worldmaker only commits the use-mention fallacy if he presupposes a 
realist position about properties and objects.  But this is precisely what the worldmaker 
does not do.  Devitt’s critique, for instance, amounts to arguing that constructivism is 
wrong, because the realism Devitt holds is correct. 
But there is a charitable way to present Devitt’s criticism such that it does not 
presuppose realism and would thus be more germane to the task of demonstrating the 
alleged errors of worldmaking.  Consider a scenario in which we take away our 
perspective and it seems some fact still exists
65
 – for example, that such-and-such 
mushroom has the property of being noxious to humans.  This particular mushroom is 
going to be noxious no matter how we construct the world.  There will always be 
something “out there” that despite our constructive role in the world, it will be the case – 
it is a fact no matter the perspective.  In the spirit of Devitt, then, however we 
conceptualize it, this world still stays the same in some way – it does not follow that our 
conceptualization brings about a fact.  There is some bit of stuff that does the same thing 
– it is a fact that this mushroom has the property of being noxious to human beings.  But 
if this is the case, then there is a property and a fact about that property pre-construction 
and even post-construction, because it remains the same under each description of the 
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world.  And so the world is in this sense readymade, and the worldmaker has some 
explaining to do. 
The worldmaker can respond by claiming that this mushroom’s property of being 
noxious only emerges out of a conceptual framework.  The objection ignores that there 
cannot be concept-transcendent properties of things.  The mushroom can only have the 
property of being noxious after we have categorized it along with other noxious things – 
and all that after we have delineated the criteria for object-hood.  It is a mistake to say the 
mushroom had that property inherently, and we picked it out.  Of course, just as with the 
case concerning stars explained above, once we have come up with the concept of 
noxiousness through our cognitive work, we can coherently include in that concept that 
the mushroom was always noxious regardless of our existence.  But for the mushroom to 
be noxious in the first place requires our cognitive making and organization.  
Accordingly, that “b is R,” in Devitt’s example above, makes no sense without 
delineating what counts as “R,” and b for that matter, in the first place.  Without doing 
so, no reference can even occur.  Devitt has his picture of the world backwards and 
simply misses the point in his criticism of worldmaking. 
What goes for my response to Devitt goes for the non sequitur Searle and 
Scheffler pin on worldmaking’s principal claim.  As I argued above, there is no sense to 
be made of predetermined objects, properties, and facts.  Having access to a readymade 
ontology is impossible without first having delineated the boundaries of objects, and their 
properties and facts.  If the world is to have any characteristics at all, then from the notion 
that we play a role in making the world, we must allow that it does indeed follow that we 
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construct the world.  Worldmaking, therefore, avoids the problems posed by both the use-
mention fallacy and the alleged non sequitur. 
Worldmaking is Committed to the Problem of Disagreement 
Boghossian, in addition to his criticisms set forth above, raises the problem of 
disagreement, which is aimed at worldmaking’s pluralistic component.  He argues that 
worldmaking succumbs to a contradiction, and thereby fails to comply with the Law of 
Non-Contradiction – it is impossible both that P and that not-P.66  Boghossian arrives at 
this assessment by arguing that because the constructivist position includes the principle 
that our construction of the world depends on our particular projects and interests, it is 
possible that we construct contradictory ontologies.  To illustrate his argument, 
Boghossian asks his reader to consider a scenario in which Society-Δ constructs a state of 
affairs such that P obtains.  Society-Σ, on the other hand, constructs a state of affairs such 
that not-P obtains.
67
  He then argues as follows: 
1. Since we have constructed the fact that P, P. 
2. And since it is possible that another community should have 
constructed the facts that not-P, then possibly not-P. 
3. So:  It is possible that both P and not-P.68 
 
But, by the Law of Non-Contradiction, it is impossible for P and not-P to obtain.  
Therefore, because this is the case, Boghossian argues constructivist theses like 
worldmaking must be able to account for such incompatibilities.  But, he further notes 
that this is a problem to which worldmaking has no answer.  The objection, according to 
Boghossian, is “decisive.”69 
Response to the Problem of Disagreement 
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Although worldmaking permits conflicting, yet true sentences or versions, it does 
not, however, violate the Law of Non-Contradiction, as Boghossian argues.  As put forth 
in the foregoing, Goodman argues that contradictory sentences or versions that are 
alternatively true cannot, nevertheless, both be true in the same world.  Thus, because we 
make worlds by making versions, the contradictory versions are embedded, respectively, 
in distinct worlds.  But if each version is in a distinct world, it follows trivially that they 
are not in the same world.  Therefore, both statements or versions cannot be asserted or 
maintained at the same time, and so, the Law of Non-Contradiction is upheld.   
Consider, just as Boghossian does, two societies which construct incompatible 
world-versions.  Let us call them what we named them above, Society-Δ and Society-Σ.  
Boghossian considers a situation in which Society-Δ and Society-Σ construct 
contradictory world-versions; Society-Δ constructs a state of affairs such that P obtains 
and Society-Σ constructs a state of affairs such that not-P obtains.  He is certainly correct 
that when conjoined, these world-versions violate the Law of Non-Contradiction.  He is 
wrong, however, in claiming worldmaking cannot account for such a scenario.  The 
incompatible world-versions are true of distinct worlds, the worldmaker would argue, not 
one and the same world.  Thus, there is no danger of breaching the Law of Non-
Contradiction. 
Ultimately, then, the inadequacy of Boghossian’s criticism is located in his 
interpretation of worldmaking’s pluralistic component.  His misunderstanding70 of the 
position leads him to argue that different societies positing contradictory theories or 
world-versions are operating in the same universe of discourse or the same world.  That 
being the case, he draws the conclusion that worldmaking violates a fundamental law of 
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logic.  But, as I have argued, this is not the worldmaker’s position.  Worldmaking does 
not violate the Law of Non-Contradiction, because of the particular brand of pluralism 
built into the position. Moreover, because worldmaking can account for the 
incompatibilities Boghossian advances against it, it is therefore not susceptible to his 
criticism. 
Part III 
 On balance, I find the criticisms advanced against worldmaking unconvincing and 
unsatisfactory.  As I have shown, criticisms of the position either miss their target entirely 
or fail to undermine the position successfully.  Because this is the case, worldmaking 
stands as a plausible position.  And although it may run contrary to most philosophers’ 
and even non-philosophers’ intuitions about the way the world is, I believe my efforts 
above should persuade opponents to consider worldmaking more seriously as a credible 
and viable alternative to competing views on the nature of objects, properties, and facts.  
Thus, I shall hereafter argue in support of worldmaking against one of its most diehard 
competitors, metaphysical realism.
71
  I will proceed by offering an overview of 
metaphysical realism.  Thereafter, I shall raise three issues covering (1) objects, (2) 
properties, and (3) satisfactory, yet contradictory theories, all of which will show that 
where metaphysical realism proves inadequate, worldmaking prevails as a more 
satisfactory, and plausible, position. 
A Compendious Overview of Metaphysical Realism 
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 In the aforementioned I adumbrated the metaphysical realist’s position, but I now 
wish to focus on a particular articulation of metaphysical realism
72
 expressed by Putnam, 
and an argument Devitt sets forth in support of the position.  First, Putnam’s 
characterization of realism is as follows: 
On this perspective, the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-
independent objects.  There is exactly one true and complete description of 
‘the way the world’ is.  Truth involves some sort of correspondence 
relation between words or thought-signs and external things and sets of 
things…its favorite point of view is a God’s Eye point of view.73 
 
Putnam’s description is not, of course, the sole way of representing realism, but it serves 
to provide us with a general flavor of the position’s major tenets.  The world’s ontology, 
according to realism, does not depend at all on our cognitive powers, much less our 
existence.  Objects, properties, and relations obtaining between objects all exist 
independently of how we conceptualize and categorize the world.  Stars, mountains, 
trees, rocks, etcetera, and the properties constitutive of their being the objects they are 
exist readymade.  The most we can do with regard to these objects is discover their 
inherent properties and figure out which of them is essential to, and thereby constitutive 
of, their being objects of a particular kind.  Objects are as they are no matter what we 
think about them. 
 Staunch proponent of realism and familiar opponent to worldmaking, Michael 
Devitt, advances an argument in support of the realist position predicated upon what he 
calls commonsense, and the notion that objects exist even when we are not there to 
perceive them.
74
  Devitt’s argument is worth quoting in full, and is as follows: 
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From an early age we come to believe that such objects as stones, cats, and 
trees exist.  Furthermore, we believe that these objects exist even when we 
are not perceiving them, and that they do not depend for their existence on 
our opinions nor on anything mental.  This Realism about ordinary objects 
is confirmed day by day in our experience.  It is…the very core of 
common sense.  Given this strong case for Realism, we should give it up 
only in the face of powerful arguments against it and for an alternative.  
There are no such arguments.  That concludes the case for Realism.
75
 
 
Initially, I take issue with Devitt’s conviction that from the idea that commonsense tells 
us objects exist independently of us, it does not necessarily follow that they do in fact 
exist independently of us.  I shall argue for this more thoroughly in what follows, but I 
would like to take note that commonsense, or day-by-day experience, is not a particularly 
strong principle to abide by.  Commonsense tells us that we ought not to eat food that has 
fallen on a dirty floor, because it could be inimical to our health.  However, it does not 
follow with necessity that eating dirty-floor-food will make us sick if ingested – we may 
get lucky, much to our mothers’ dismay.  Analogously, because commonsense tells us 
objects like stones, cats, and trees exist independently of us whether we perceive them or 
not, it does not follow that it is the case that objects are not dependent upon our 
cognition. 
My task henceforth is to show Devitt, and the reader, that there are convincing 
arguments against realism, which should influence us to reconsider its plausibility.  
Moreover, I shall fulfill Devitt’s second request, the demand for an alternative, by 
arguing that worldmaking stands as a viable alternative to realism.  To these arguments I 
shall now turn. 
A Problem Regarding Object Differentiation 
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As discussed in the explication above, worldmakers maintain that object-hood 
depends upon our cognitive constructions.  Of course, worldmakers are not merely 
speaking of objects like artifacts – for example, tables and chairs.  These are trivial, 
uncontroversial cases in which we are clearly making the objects under consideration.  
On the contrary, the idea is that until we differentiate, say, stars from other celestial stuff 
using whatever principle of individuation we find appropriate to the task, there are, 
strictly speaking, no objects called ‘stars’. 
Now, when realism is pitted against worldmaking it may be argued that either (1) 
objects exist independently of us or (2) their existence depends on us.  If we consider the 
first disjunct true, then realism is vindicated.  No matter how much we think we are 
carving up the world through our categorizations and conceptualizations, we are simply 
misled if we think the world takes on the character we impose on it through these 
processes.  Objects in the world are not a product of our cognitive making, but instead, 
they merely exist for us to discover and make sense of. 
To reiterate Searle’s and Scheffler’s point, that the world is actually constructed 
via our concepts is not a necessary consequence of the fact that we use concepts to 
understand or make rational sense of the world.  Take humans out of the picture, and the 
world’s objects – say, its rocks and trees – remain actually distinct objects.  Thus, one 
might object that the worldmaker has put the cart before the horse.  That we are able to 
determine object-hood for something does not depend on our conceptual making, but 
instead, object-hood is a characteristic of something because it comes to us pre-delineated 
and pre-conceptualized.  We are able to differentiate between a rock and a tree not 
because we have conceptualized and categorized these objects from the sensible flux of 
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experience, but rather, because the rock and the tree, independently of our doings, are 
simply distinct entities – these objects are readymade. Thus, objects are not dependent on 
human cognitive making for their existence. 
Although realism has strong intuitive or commonsensical appeal for most 
philosophers and non-philosophers alike, it is, I think, deceptively convincing.  Positing 
that objects exist independently of us because, as Searle argues, if we imagine humans 
becoming extinct, then objects will remain, does not necessarily entail that objects do in 
fact exist independently of us.  The force and significance of Searle’s thought experiment 
is not so much that if we were to become extinct tomorrow, then objects would continue 
existing.  I think this is best understood as a rhetorical flourish intended to persuade the 
careless reader.  Instead, I take Searle to suggest that if we did not exist at all, objects 
would still exist. 
If we read Searle as I just suggested, and ignore his rhetorical flourish, then his 
argument becomes a bit suspicious.  It is a mistake to consider object-hood independently 
of human cognition, because if we were not to exist at all, then there is no sense in which 
objects exist, either.  It can be admitted that an unspecified, characterless stuff exists 
independently of us, but until we carve it up by delineating certain boundaries, and 
thereby differentiate this “stuff,” there are properly speaking no objects.  For instance, 
picking out stars in the firmament requires that we first have the relevant concepts which 
constitute star-hood and the appropriate categories to put them in – say, large bright 
celestial objects.  Once again, as Quine teaches us, “[t]here is no entity without 
identity.”76  Thus, there may be a sensible flux of experience, a characterless reality 
consisting of no objects, independent of our cognitive making, but this is most certainly 
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not the reality envisaged by the realist.  Indeed, it is bleak and bland.  Objects simply do 
not exist without our first demarcating the sensible flux.  The first disjunct is, therefore, 
false – objects do not exist independently of humans.  Accordingly, it follows that objects 
depend upon us for their existence. 
Worldmaking, therefore, better explains how we can make rational sense of 
objects and what is constitutive of object-hood than realism, because realism does not 
provide us with adequate tools to distinguish between objects when we are first 
confronted with the world.  It simply makes no sense to designate something with the 
name ‘object’ until we have the proper concepts and categories in place.  Object-hood, 
consequently, depends on conceptualization.  Because realism does not account for this, 
worldmaking takes primacy over and against realism with regard to making sense of how 
objects come into existence. 
A Problem Regarding Properties 
Worldmakers are committed to the idea that we play a role in making the 
properties objects have.  For instance, when we are trying to distinguish between a star 
and other celestial matter, we shape the properties by which star-hood is determined, as 
Goodman writes, “drawing certain boundaries rather than others.”77  There are no 
readymade, inherent properties essential to star-hood in reality, which are discovered by 
humans, giving us the appropriate signifiers by which we can recognize stars.  The same 
goes for our more familiar terrestrial objects like trees or flowers. 
Realists, on the other hand, believe that the properties constitutive of object-hood 
do exist readymade.  Such properties do not depend on us for their existence.  Rather, we 
                                                        
77
 Goodman, “Notes on the Well-Made World,” 156. 
   
33 
are merely capable of discovering what they are.  It will be helpful to reconsider some of 
Devitt’s illustrations from his argument against worldmaking, as he takes them, also, to 
support realism. 
In particular, I want to focus on his argument regarding roses and the property 
they must have in order to be denoted by the expression ‘rose’.  To reiterate, here is 
Devitt’s argument:  “(1) ‘rose’ refers…to something in virtue of its being R (where…‘R’ 
expresses whatever property something must have to be referred to by ‘rose’)…The 
meaning of ‘rose’ does not alone determine, for example, that (2) ‘rose’ refers to b.  To 
establish (2), we need not only (1) but also (3) b is R.  And (3) is something that is right 
outside our control.”78  That b is R, according to Devitt, is controlled and decided by the 
world, not by human cognition.  We must discover whether b is R in order to successfully 
refer to b with the expression ‘rose’.  Devitt takes it that any view to the contrary is 
simply false. 
What Devitt and other proponents of realism fail to recognize is that there is no 
sense to be made of pairing expressions to objects without first determining what counts 
as a particular object in the first place.  For instance, borrowing Devitt’s example, that b 
is R must first be established by whatever concept is relevant and appropriate to the task.  
That b is R, in other words, falls under the purview of human conceptualization, and does 
not come in the world readymade.  If it does not fall under our purview, then we would 
merely attend to the object, since b would be devoid of any character – that is, properties 
– indicating to us what kind of object it is; we must, in other words, determine its 
character in order for reference to occur, much less be successful.   
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Consider a further example.  That x is an object referred to by the expression 
‘hard’ is determined by our placing it in the relevant kind ‘hardness’.  But the kind 
‘hardness’ does not exist readymade in the world.  Saying that it does would be akin to 
saying the predicate ‘is Mrs. Jones’s dog’ in the sentence ‘Rufus is Mrs. Jones’s dog’ 
exists readymade in the world.  We create the kind ‘hardness’ through conceptualization.  
And once this is established, we can then further determine which entities are 
appropriately grouped under it.  This is the way in which we decide what counts as 
having the property hardness.  And until this occurs, x does not have the property of 
being hard.  Thus, referring to x as being hard, as well as x having the property hardness, 
depends on our conceptualization and categorization. 
Although I believe Devitt is correct in asserting that the expression ‘rose’ cannot 
by itself establish that ‘rose’ refers to some object, he is wrong to think that the property 
R is outside our control.  Quite the contrary, we determine the reference relation (that 
‘rose’ refers to an object that is R), that b is R, and, accordingly, that ‘rose’ refers to b.  
Realism cannot satisfactorily account for such cases, while worldmaking can. Thus, 
worldmaking stands as a more satisfactory, and plausible, alternative to realism with 
regard to positing an adequate account of properties. 
Accounting For Satisfactory, Yet Contradictory Theories 
We often encounter contradictory theories and ontologies – for example, the 
world as flat and the world as round, and Euclidean geometry and non-Euclidean 
geometry.  Realists, as I have characterized them, believe that such attempts at making 
sense of the world are attempts at describing it veridically or discovering facts inherent in 
it.  Thus, although realists could allow for incompatible versions or descriptions of the 
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79
, they nonetheless remain in conflict since they refer to one and the same world. 
Conversely, worldmaking can allow for incompatible world-versions that do not conflict 
in one and the same world since each world-version can be taken as a distinct world.  
Thus, it is not the versions that are in conflict per se, but rather, as Goodman puts the 
point, it is worlds that are in conflict. 
Consider a situation in which two equally satisfactory theories or world-versions 
are incompatible with each other.  Further suppose both have the same predictive power 
and equal degrees of satisfactoriness when it comes to their explanatory power, but they 
both do so in divergent, incompatible ways.  Under one conception of realism, analogous 
to Putnam’s description above, one theory must be eliminated.  There seems to be no 
harm done in this scenario, as both theories are satisfactory.  However, the elimination is 
liable to create controversy, generating not only a conflict of theories but also a conflict 
of personalities. 
Under a slightly modified realism, one which allows for relativism, both theories 
may remain in tact.  But this allows for incompatibility within the same world.  If we 
think of the world and everything it contains as our universe of discourse, then we are 
allowing for incompatibility within our universe of discourse, which is an unacceptable 
consequence.  Thus, even if realists allow for relativism, contradictory theories still 
conflict within the same universe of discourse.  The advantage of worldmaking, on the 
other hand, lies in its principle that contradictory theories are best understood as falling 
under the scope of distinct universes of discourse – that is, distinct worlds, as different 
world-versions constitute distinct worlds.  Worldmaking, therefore, better accounts for 
incompatible theories and world-versions, both of which are nonetheless satisfactory or 
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true, and realism simply cannot do this in virtue of its principles.  Thus, again, we see that 
worldmaking constitutes a viable and more attractive position over and against realism. 
Conclusion 
 I believe I have accomplished at least two feats in the foregoing.  The first of 
which concerns my defense of worldmaking.  As I have argued already, I think the 
arguments leveled against worldmaking miss their mark either by failing to show the 
position to be implausible or by misunderstanding it entirely.  Second, because I have 
demonstrated that worldmaking does not fall prey to the above criticisms, I then showed 
that it should be regarded as a plausible metaphysical position among its competitors, 
namely, metaphysical realism.  Worldmaking provides a better account of the world than 
realism, and because this is the case, stands as a viable alternative to realism.  The 
position is, therefore, not a silly one, but rather, a plausible way in which we can make 
rational sense of the world and our place in it. 
As a result, I believe my attempts should influence philosophers to take the 
worldmaker more seriously, and to consider the ways in which worldmaking stands as a 
tenable position and an alternative to so-called intuitive metaphysical perspectives like 
realism.  A recent commentator and contributor to the polemic concerning worldmaking, 
Iris Einheuser, writes, 
The facts are what they are and we do our best to discover them, some of 
us with more, some with less success.  Departure from this commonsense 
picture requires both a strong motivation that stems from reflection on the 
nature of the facts in question…and a detailed enough account of how 
these facts are supposed to be socially constructed.  The right to a 
constructivist position has to be earned and I expect that once they have 
been shown just how hard it is to formulate a coherent, let alone plausible, 
version…many people will retreat to modesty.80 
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I hope I have convinced the reader to some degree not to retreat to modesty, but instead, 
that there is good reason to forge ahead.  Einheuser’s observation is certainly a 
perspicacious one insofar as the task will not be easy.  However, I believe I have shown 
herein that worldmaking stands up in the face of criticism and on that score it should be 
treated not only as a plausible position on its own, but as a reasonable and serious 
alternative to realism. 
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